The goal of this course is to understand the basic principles of evolutionary dynamics and evolutionary game theory, and to be able to apply that in order to understand how evolution shapes human behaviour in general and behaviour in economic situations in particular.
We will learn to use static equilibrium concepts, such as the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), dynamic concepts, such as the replicator dynamics, and the relation between the two. In finite population settings, we also learn what the Moran process is, and get accustomed to evolutionary graph theory.
We will also encounter kin selection, group selection and sexual selection, both Zahavi's handicap principle and Fisher's runaway process, in order to understand possible explanations for pro-social behaviour. Also behaviour in repeated games and the evolution of reciprocity will be discussed in order to understand laboratory findings concerning human behaviour. We will also read experimental papers that test evolutionary theories.
Please go to https://www.sis.uva.nl.
Two times two hours. There is no differentiation between tutorial and lecture.
Please go to http://rooster.uva.nl.
- Weibull, J.W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA., c. €27;
- Nowak, M.A. (2006). Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, c. €37.
- Final exam (2/3) and assignment (1/3).;
- Resit exam (3/3);
- Final exam and resit exam: a written examination, open questions;
- Assignment: read a paper, give a presentation and write a short essay on the evolutionary interpretation of the paper's results.
Please go to http://rooster.uva.nl and http://www.student.uva.nl/feb-academicyear.